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0. Introduction
In this paper, I will discuss the syntax and semantics of nominalized con-
structions in the framework of Montague Grammar. The four types of
nominalized constructions below will be in the scope of this study.
a. that clause
b. for-to clause
c. to-infinitive
d. (verbal) gerund
I will claim that we need to modify the notion of individual in order to
analyze nominalized constructions properly, and a new kind of individual,
Situation Individuals, will be incorporated into the domain of individuals.
And further, taking into consideration the semantic properties of each type
of nominalized constructions, I will divide the Situation Individual into two
subtypes, Situation Type(henceforth, S-type) and Situation Token(S-token).
1. Syntax of Nominalized Constructions
In this section, I will consider a traditional approach to nominalized con-
structions and propose an alternative.
1.1. Traditional approach in Montague Grammar: Partee(1977)
Partee(1977) attempts to formulate the syntax of to-infinitives.
(1) To please John is easy.
She treats the to-infinitive in (1) as an IV. Since the category IV corresponds
to the type <e, t>, which denotes a property, the type which predicates
something of the type <e, t> must be <<e, t>, t>, which denotes a set of
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properties. So she introduces IV of property-level, IV, which corresponds
to this type, <<e, t>, t>. By virtue of this extension of the category system,
we can analyze sentences like (1):
(2) To please John is easy.
IV	 TV
<e, t>	 <<e, t>, t>
According to her analysis, the sentence (1) means that the property expressed
by to please John is in the set of properties expressed by is easy. Needless
to say, if we admit this property-level IV, we have to admit bar-level
categories in all categories whose definitions are dependent on IV: T IV/IV,
etc
This analysis has a few problems. First, if we consider that bar-level
categories themselves can be nominalized, we have to admit higher bar-level
categories: T, TV, etc. And there is no upper limit in such a process. (This
problem was pointed out in Chierchia(1982).) Second, if we consider other
types of nominalization, we face another problem. Consider the sentences
below:
(3) a. That John killed Mary surprised Bill.
b. For people to love their children is common.
If we follow Partee(1977), the subject and the predicate in (3a) should be
assigned types as below:
(4) That John Kissed Mary surprised Bill.
<5, t>	 <<s, t>, t>
That is, that John kissed Mary is naturally regarded as a proposition, which
is of type <s, t>, so the predicate, surprised Bill, must be of type <<s, t>,
t>. Hence we must introduce another type of category other than property-
level categories (i. e. proposition-level categories). As you can see from this
argument, this approach loses the simplicity and consistency of the category
system. If it is possible, we should avoid this approach.
1.2. An Alternative
As is evident from the discussion in 1.1, Partee's approach, in which we
assign each of the types<e, t>, <s, t> to to-infinitives and that clauses respec-
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tively, causes complication of the category system. Then, how can we treat
these and other nominalized constructions properly? Consider the sentence
below:
(5) John killed Mary.
e	 Ce, t>
As indicated, John is of type e, and killed Mary is of type <e, t>. If we
assume that all types of nominalized constructions (i.e. to-infinitive, that
clause, for-to clause, gerund) denote individual like John, we need no
categories other than the traditional ones. Therefore I introduce the follow-
ing function, which maps propositions into the domain of individuals:
(6) Individualizing Function (IF)
(i) Domain: All - 0, - 0 E ME<s, t>
(ii) Range IF (- 0) E A
ME: meaningful expression
- 0: proposition
A: domain of individuals
This function recasts all propositions into individuals. I will call the in-
dividuals Situation Individuals, since it is natural to regard propositions
as denoting situations. (I use the term 'situation' as a cover term for 'event'
and 'state'.) By virtue of this function, we can treat all types of nominaliz-
ed constructions without introducing categories of new types. But we must
consider whether this function, which incorporates situations into the do-
main of individuals, is semantically valid or not. Note the following ex-
amples from Jackendoff (1983):
(7) a. I bought this yesterday.	 (Thing)
b. That(pointing) had better not happen again around her. (Event)
(8) a. What did you buy? — a fish.	 (Thing)
b. What happened next? — Billy fell out the window. 	 (Event)
something(9) a. Bill picked up	 that Jack picked up.	 (Thing)
everything
b. Something that happened yesterday also happened today.(Event)Everything
According to Jackendoff, (7-9) indicates that situations can be treated as,
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in our terminology, individuals. (7b) indicates that situations can be refer-
red to by pragmatic anaphors just like things. (8b) indicates that situations
can be the targets of wh-questions. (9b) indicates that situations can be quan-
tified over in the same way as things. This consistent parallelism between
situations and things constitutes strong evidence that justifies the function
in (6).
Though I stated that John is of type e to simplify the argument, technical-
ly, John constitutes a term phrase (type <<s, <e, t>>, t>). In order for
all types of nominalized constructions to constitute term phrases parallel
with John, I introduce the category below:
(10) COMP { to, -ing, for-to, that
Categorial Definiton: T/t
Corresponding Type: <<, s t>, <<s, <e, t>>, t>>
This category takes a sentence(proposition) as an input and yields a term
phrase (a set of properties of a Situation Individual). With these innova-
tions, we can treat nominalized constructions syntactically without damaging
the category system.
(11) a. That I went to the beach was surprising to Bill.
b. For John to go to the beach is difficult.
c. To go to the beach is enjoyable.
d. Going to the beach is enjoyable.
The analysis tree of (11a, b) is as follows (irrelevant structures are omitted):
{(12) that I went to the beach was surprising to Bill 1
for John to go to the beach is difficult	 I, t
that I went to the beach
for John to go to the beach I. , T
<<s, <e, t>>, t>
was surprising to Bilkf
is difficult	 J, IV
<e, t>
that1
for-to j	
{ I went to the beach
,COMP (T/t) John go to the beach j , t
<<s, t>, <<s, <e, t>>, t>>
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Though the individualizing function and the category COMP make it possi-
ble to treat that/for-to clauses syntactically, to-infinitives and gerunds ((11 c,
d) above) still resist this treatment, for they are seemingly IVs, which are
not proper inputs of the category COMP. To solve this problem, I introduce
the following rule:
(13) Assume the following variable to be in the subject position, if no overt
subject exists:
h en E PT
Observe the following analysis tree (irrelevant structures are omitted):
(14) he 1 to go to beach is enjoyable
t he 1 going to the beach is enjoyable , t
{
he 1 to go to the beach
he 1 going to the beach } , T is enjoyable, IV
Ito-
, COMP (Tit) he 1 go to the beach, t
By rule (13), a variable, he 1, is inserted in the subject positions of to go
to the beach/going to the beach, so they can be treated as t's, the proper
inputs of the category COMP.
2. Semantics of Nominalized Constructions
In the last section, I showed a way to treat the nominalized constructions
syntactically. All types of nominalized constructions fall in the scope of
this treatment. The heart of the treatment is the individualizing function,
which maps propositions into the domain of individuals. But if we take
into consideration that each type of nominalization has its own semantic
properties, it is clear that we should assume different types of Situation
Individuals.
2.1. That Clause and For-to Clause
The difference of the semantic properties between that and for-to clauses
is obvious in the following examples:
128	 Hiroto Ohnishi
(15) a. That the earth is flat is true.
b. *For the earth to be flat is true.
(16) a. *That people love their children would be crazy.
b. For people to love their children would be crazy.
(Bach, 1977)
As the acceptability of the above sentences shows, the meanings of that
and for-to clauses are quite different. One of the examples that shows the
difference most prominently is the following:
(17) a. That people own handguns is illegal in England.
b. For people to own handguns is illegal in England.
(Carlson, 1979)
The that clause in (17a) denotes a specific actual situation. The for-to clause
in (17b), on the other hand, denotes not a specific situation but a certain
situation. This is the difference which Bach intuitively characterizes as that
between 'proposition' and 'eventuality'. To make this point clearer, note
the following examples, all of which are from Bach(1977):
(18) a. That the earth is flat is true.
b. *For the earth to be flat is true. ( = 15)
(19) a. *That you are here is imperative.
b. For you to be here is imperative.
(20) a. *That people love their children is common.
b. For people to love their children is common.
If we regard that clauses as denoting a specific situation and for-to clauses
as denoting a certain situation, these judgements naturally follow. Though
a specific situation can be 'true' or 'false', a certain situation cannot (in
(18)). And a specific situation cannot be common or imperative as in (19),
(20). The sentences below justify this point further:
(21) a. ??For John to kill his fish was wrong.
b. ??For John to go there bothered me.
c. That John went there bothered me.
(factive)
(22) a. For John to kill his fish would be wrong.
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b. For John to go there would bother me.
c. *That John went there would bother me.
(non-factive)
The factive predicates in (21) require their subjects to be facts. In such cases,
for-to clauses show low acceptability. If we regard a fact as a kind of specific
situation, this follows quite naturally from the point of view above. That
is, what is denoted by for-to clauses is not a specific situation but a certain
situation. On the other hand, in (22), the predicates require hypothetical
situations as their subjects, because the subjects are in the scope of would.
Since specific situations cannot be hypothetical, that clauses are not accep-
table. Now that the semantic difference between that and for-to clauses are
clear (i. e. that clause: a specific situation, for-to clause: a certain situa-
tion), let us move to the next question: Why does this semantic difference
arise?
According to Bresnan(1972), the difference depends on the complemen-
tizer meaning. That is, that 'definitizes' a complement, and for indicates
that the content of a complement is 'unrealized' . Though many investigators
follow this assumption, this analysis is dubious. Consider the following ex-
amples:
(23) a. *That you are here is imperative.
b. That you be here is imperative.
c. For you to be here is imperative.
If the semantic difference between that and for-to clauses depends solely
on the meaning of the complementizers, these examples cannot be explain-
ed: the tenseless that clause in (23b) has the same distribution pattern as
the for-to clause in (23c), and further, they share the same meaning, that
is, 'unrealized' . Note the next example in which the tensed that clause is
acceptable, and the tenseless that clause and for-to clause are not. (This
example is adapted from Huntley(1982).)
{(24) That Mary invited John to the party
*That Mary invite John to the party
	 is ture.
*For Mary to invite John to the party
If we attribute this semantic difference not to the meaning of the corn-
plementizers but to the presence or absence of tense, these facts follow
naturally. That is, since the presence or absence of tense is crucial to the
difference, tenseless that clauses and for-to clauses have the same meaning
and distribution pattern.' One more piece of evidence will be sufficient to
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confirm this point. For-to clauses with tense consistently show greater degree
of acceptability with factive predicates than those without tense.
(25) a. ??For John to kill the girl bothered me.
b. ?For John to have killed the girl bothered me.
(26) a. ??For John to kill his goldfish was wrong.
b. ?For John to have killed his goldfish was wrong.
(27) a. ??It surprised me for prisoners to be released from the jail.
b. ?It surprised me for prisoners to have been released from the jail.
From the discussion above, it should be clear that the semantic difference
between for-to and (tensed) that clause mainly depends not on the com-
plementizer meaning but on the presence or absence of tense. Why then
does the presence or absence of tense cause this difference? Before answer-
ing this question, let me define the term 'situation', which I used frequent-
ly but which is not welldefined yet.
(28) V (Argument'
(28) shows the structure of a real situation. The Argument in the bracket
indicates (most typically) real things that participate in a situation. The V
indicates a real state or action of, or a real relation between Arguments.
The V's and Arguments are expressed linguistically as verbs and arguments
subcategorized by verbs, respectively. For example, the sentence in (29a)
denotes a real situation shown in (29b):
(29) a. John killed Mary.
b. kill (John, Mary)
But this definition of a situation is not enough to identify a specific situa-
tion, because it does not pinpoint the time and the world of a situation.
For example, (29b) represents not only the situation intended by the sentence
(29a) but also all situations in which John is in a kill relation with Mary.
I therefore add one more constituent to the representation in (28): index,
which locates a situation on the plane with world and time axes.
(30) V (Argument") Index (w x t)
Following Huntley(1982, 1984), I assume that the time in an index is realized
by a tense operator, and the world by a modal operator such as can, must
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IM2 , so the situation denoted by (29a) is represented as follows:
(31) kill (John, Mary) IM/Past
The modal operator IM locates the situation uniquely in the actual world,
and the tense operator at some time earlier than the speech time. In the
sense that these constituents are indispensable for identifying a specific situa-
tion, I call them the necessary constituents of a situation.
We are now ready to answer the question: why does the presence or
absence of tense cause the semantic difference pointed out above? That
clauses (with tense) denote such situations as below, since they contain tense
and modal operators, the realizers of an index:
(32) a ((3, y) K/Q
apyxp: specified value
On the other hand, for-to clauses, which lack specification of indices, denote
situations as below:
(33) a (P, Y
a [3 y : specified value
y : variable
As is clear from the difinition above, that clauses denote specific (or uni-
quely identifiable) situations, since they contain all of the necessary consti-
tuents. But for-to denote all the situations which satisfy a ((3, y), since they
contain variables as their indices, which means they are abstracted away
from idices. In this sense, for-to clauses denote not specific situations but
types of situations which contain specific situations as their tokens.
The semantic difference between for-to and that clauses pointed out in this
section can be explained if we take this standpoint. I will call situations
without variables (as in (32)) S-token, and situations which contain variables
(as in (33)) S-type.3
2.2. To-infinitives and Subjectless Gerunds
A for-to clause is not the only construction that denotes S-type. To-
infinitives and subjectless gerunds also denote S-type, though the S-type
is different from that of for-to clauses: it is abstracted away also from the
subject.
(34) a. To kill animals is wrong.
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b. Killing animals is wrong.
The situation denoted by (34a, b) is as follows (indices can safely be ig-
nored on this topic):
(35) kill (x, animals)
x: variable
This S-type can be thought of as containing the following as its tokens,
which have constants instead of variables:
(36) kill (John, animals)
kill (Mary, animals)
kill (Ellen, animals)
kill (x, animals)
The representation in (36) correctly represents the semantic property of the
to-infinitive and gerund. In gereral, to-infinitives and subjectless gerunds
denote not specific actions but classes of actions. 4 The to-infinitive in (34)
does not denote a specific action that somebody participated in, or that
took place somewhere sometime. This semantic property easily follows if
we assume that what is denoted by to-infinitives and subjectless gerunds
is S-types whose structures are like that of (35).'
This approach is rich in consequences. For example, the following
paradigm follows naturally:
(37) a. *A man's coming in here bothered me.
	
(factive)
b. A man's coming in here would bother me.
	
	
(non-factive)
(Pope, 1976)
In general, gerunds with indefinite subjects can not go with factive
predicates. As far as I know, there is no explicit explanation for this fact.
Consider the situation denoted by a man's coming in here:
(38) coming—in—here (max (x))
Since a man is indefinite, it is a variable ranging over 'man'. As the struc-
ture in (38) contains a variable, it is an S-type. Factive predicates requiring
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subjects to be facts(i. e. specific situations), S-types are refused.
2.3. Formalization
As discussed above, there are two types of situations: S-type and S-token.
Since situations are in the domain of individuals by the individualizing func-
tion, there must be two kinds of individual. I assume here that there are
two strata in the domain of individuals: the type stratum, and the token
stratum. The situations with one or more variables (S-types) are in the type
stratum, and others are in the token stratum.
(39) The domain of individuals
e-type
e-token
The e-type is related to e-token by value-assignment. Since an individual
in the e-type stratum has one or more variables in it, it is supposed to have
a set of ways tot
 be realized as an e-token, that is, it has a set of ways of
value-assignment. This relationship is expressed by the lines in (39).
Technically, this stratification is accomplished by imposing conditions
on the individualizing function as follows. The motivation for these condi-
tions must be clear from the discussion in the above section.
(40) ( i ) If ^ 0 does not cantain a tense/IM operator, then it is mapped
into the e-type stratum.
(ii) If ^ 0 contains an unbound variable (hen), then it is mapped in-
to the e-type stratum.
(iii) Otherwise, ^ 0 is mapped into the e-token stratum.
3. Summary
The theory of nominalization which I have just sketched is far from com-
plete. There are many points that must be carefully considered or made
explicit. First of all, the approach to semantic properties of nominalized
constructions given in section 2 is also quite possible in the framework of
the newly developed Situation Semantics, since we assume a structure of
situations similar in important features. I should make explicit the advan-
tages and disadvantages in taking this direction, but not knowing the
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framework in full detail, I am not ready to discuss this matter. Second,
I said nothing about modal operators other than IM. It should be made
clear what possible worlds they refer to. But these problems aside, the ap-
proach presented here is one way to treat nominalization phenomena.
NOTES
*Many thanks are due to my teacher, Prof. Minoru Nakau, who helped
me progress, and Hiroaki Tada, who kept me excited on this topic. I would
also like to thank all the participants of this workshop for their invaluable
comments. Finally, I wish to thank Wayne Lawrence for kindly acting as
an informant. Needless to say, all errors are my own.
1. The argument here is essentially based on Huntley (1982, 1984).
2. The model operator IM(indicative mood) is assumed to be in a finite
clause which contains no modal auxiliary. It refers to the actual world.
3. As for this point, gerunds seem to denote both types of situations.
(i ) a. For John to go there would bother me.
b. John's going there would bother me.
c. *That John went there would bother me.
(non-factive)
(ii) a. ??For John to go there bothered me.
b. John's going there bothered me.
c. That John went there bothered me.
(factive)
As is clear from the above examples, gerunds sometimes behave like for-to
clauses, which denote S-type, and sometimes like (tensed) that clauses, which
deonte S-token. This fact follows quite naturally, if we assume that gerunds
are assigned their indices from the main clauses. In (ii), since the index in
the main clause is specified, the gerund is assigned its index and denotes
an S-token. On the other hand, the main clause in (i) does not have a specific
index, so the index of the gerunds remains unspecified. Therefore it denotes
an S-type like for-to clauses.
4. We have to exclude from this observation cases in which a subject is con-
textually given, and cases in which a subject is controlled by another ele-
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ment in the sentence.
5. Schachter(1976) tries to explain this fact by structural analogy with NPs
without determiners. According to his analysis, subjectiess gerunds have
the following structure:
(i) NP
	
DET	 NOM
/A\
	0 	 VP
Ordinary NPs share this structure(i.e. (DET)NOM). NPs without deter-
miners refer to a class of objects as the sentences below show:
(ii) a. Milk does something for everybody.
b. Beans are a cheap source of protein.
The gerunds without initial possessive NPs, which are nominals without
determiners in his analysis, also refer not to a specific action but to a class.
But this analysis is problematic. To-infinitives also share this class of
action reading (cf. (34)). As far as I know, there is no justification for assign-
ing a (DET) NOM structure to to-infinitives. So the explanation for this
fact must be based not on such structural analogy, but on indeterminacy
of a subject.
REFERENCES
Bach, E. 1977. "Review Article: On raising by Paul M. Postal," Language
53:621-53.
Bresnan, J. W. 1972. Theory of Complementation in English. MIT ph.D.
dissertation.
Carlson, G. N. 1979. "Comments on infinitives," in Papers Presented to
Emmon Bach, E. Engdahl and M. Stein (eds.) Amherst: G.L.S.A.
Chierchia, G. 1982. "Nominalization in Montague Grammar: A Seman-
tics without Types for Natural Languages," Linguistics and
136	 Hiroto Ohnishi
Philosophy 5: 303-54.
Huntley, M. 1982. "Imperatives and Infinitival Embedded Questions," in
Papers from the Parasession on Non-declaratives, Chicago
Linguistic Society.
	 . 1984. "The Semantics of English Imperatives," Linguistics and
Philosophy. 7: 103-33.
Jackendoff, R. 1983. Semantics and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
Montague, R. 1973. "The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary
English," in Approache to Nay ral Language, Hintikka et al.
(eds.) Dordrecht: Reidel.
Partee, B. H. 1977. "John is Easy to Please," in Language Structure Pro-
cessing, Zampolli (ed.) Amsterdam: North Holland.
Pope, E. N. 1976. Questions and Answers in English. The Hague: Mouton.
Schachter, P. 1976. "A Nontransformational Account of Gerundive
Nominals in English," Linguistic Inquiry 7: 205-241.
